War with China in the 21st Century?

Over the past decade, tensions with China have ebbed and flowed. If these tensions escalate into conflict, what will a war with China look like? First, it is important to note that a war with China today will not be a replay of the war against Japan in WW II. In WW II, our industrial might overcame many obstacles, both foreign (the enemy) and domestic (our bureaucracy). Our industrial capacity dwarfed that of Japan, and it also overcame US government inefficiency. In World War II, we built a mass-enabled military for a conventional, relatively low-tech global conflict. Today our military is a blend of both old and new systems, and we are not fully embracing the promise of the ongoing technological revolution. As events in the Ukraine illustrate, we in the US keep preparing for the last war, while the Ukrainians, Houthis, and Hamas are tossing Clausewitz into the trash bin, while embracing their inner Sun Tzu. Said a different way, they are purposely ripping up the conventional warfare playbook and designing, innovating, and creating new and incredibly brilliant ways to kill their enemies. The current scale and scope of emerging technology is without historical precedent. The proliferation of drones and anti-ship missiles provide low cost, high-payoff kinetic capabilities. Advancements in cyber, electronic warfare, and space based ISR round out the non-kinetic, yet highly impactful means to optimize the kill chain. Artificial Intelligence and man-machine teaming will provide forces cognitive overmatch against adversaries. These developments should give us pause. We as a nation are vulnerable to asymmetric threats across the threat spectrum, especially those targeting our digital commons, electric grid, food supply, and transportation networks. Complicating matters is the anemic condition of our industrial base in certain sectors, such as conventional and precision munitions. Our true center of gravity in WWII was our ability to generate mass at unprecedented scale. No serious threat ever disrupted or hampered this production capability. Today, our tech-enabled industry, both legacy and modern, is very efficient, but not very resilient, regenerative or secure. Rebuilding that resilience will require expanding the Defense Industrial Base to include America’s most innovative commercial companies, not just the traditional primes, and removing the procurement barriers that keep them out.

Conflict with China could manifest itself in one of two ways. One view is the Communist Central Party (CCP) does not want, nor are they planning, for a protracted fight against the United States. They realize Great Power peers do not fight limited wars against each other; as these wars are usually protracted. The CCP also fears the domestic ramifications of an extended conflict and they know starting a conflict is much easier than ending it. The CCP also recognizes that conflict is tremendously costly in terms of resources, manpower, international reputation, and domestic stability. Their preference may be to achieve their strategic objectives via minimal kinetic and non-kinetic means. This approach is not novel, as it conforms to the Sun Tzu approach of “winning without fighting”. A different view is China may be setting conditions for a 21^st century blitzkrieg in the Pacific and the US homeland. This approach would leverage the Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) instruments of PRC national power. An attack by China would strive to achieve a level of simultaneity that would generate unprecedented disruption in all facets of US national power and well-being. Prior to the attack, China would patiently and deliberately work to gain increased influence with US allies and partners in the Pacific. They will also continue to gain status and seek domination of multinational regional assemblages, such as the UN, ASEAN, and WTO. For example, the PRC is the chair for many of the fifteen most influential UN subcommittees. The Chinese have learned that ignoring or condemning international organizations as they used to do was at odds with their long-range goals. They now have decided to not just go along, but “lead along”.

To counter the China threat we need to create a US defense establishment that redefines how we look at creating, procuring and maintaining our instruments of war. At the same time, we always need to be prepared for the potential Pacific “away game”. We need a force that leverages the US DIME and embraces emerging technology to provide integrated offensive and defensive warfighting capability – and a procurement system that can deliver those capabilities in months, not decades, by making commercial solutions the default choice where they exist. In this same vein, we need to acknowledge that 21^st century problems require 21^st century solutions. Unfortunately, our 20^th century institutions are struggling to deal with the complexity and velocity of technological change. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the joint commands are past due in terms of much needed organizational reform. To date, the most consequential pieces of legislation for our national defense were the 1947 National Security Act and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Though far reaching in their day, these initiatives require a re-look and a re-do. Our legacy institutions and processes are ill equipped to keep pace with the threat. They are built for a slow, compliance-driven acquisition model that rewards incumbency over innovation. Reform must empower portfolio-level acquisition authority and adopt iterative commercial practices proven in industry. We view capability development through a FYDP lens, while the threat improvises, innovates, and iterates at a much higher speed and fielding scale. A National Security Act of 2026 and Goldwater-Nicols 2.0 could create a US defense design optimized for today’s emerging threats. This design would include a leaner OSD and Joint Staff, the empowerment of Combatant Commands in terms of budget authorities, and incentives and rewards for Service innovation in emerging technologies. At the Service level, the business rules for capability development should be revised to facilitate timely production and delivery of needed capabilities. We also need to provide incentives, both career enhancing and financial, to DoD uniform and civilian team members who prove to be innovative and in tune with the needs of the modern military. Culture matters, and changing the incentives within the Pentagon will drive innovation and lethality. Lastly, in WWII we had double the population and ten times the manufacturing capability of the Japanese. Today, China has four times the population and double the manufacturing capability of the US. The fate of each country is inextricably linked to who can produce the best arsenal for 21^st century deterrence and conflict. The ongoing DoD reform efforts need to be accelerated and even more disruptive to provide the change needed to deter and if need be, defeat China in armed conflict.

Lieutenant General Mike Dana, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Mike Dana, USMC (Ret.) is an expert in strategic planning, logistics, and innovation. In 2019, he retired after 37 years of service in the United States Marine Corps. In his last two assignments, he was the head of Marine Corps Logistics and then the Director of the Marine Corps Staff. During Mike’s decades of service, he deployed 10 times, to include Saudi Arabia in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Croatia in 1996, Kuwait in 2004, Iraq in 2006, Haiti in 2010 and Afghanistan in 2011. He served on joint duty three times, to include tours as the NORTHCOM J-4 and PACOM J-5. As a Lieutenant General, he formed the Next Generation Logistics Team (NEXLOG), which found new and adaptive ways to leverage emerging technology for Marine Corps logistics. Mike is a Senior Director with Pallas Advisors and serves on a variety of Advisory Boards. He earned a master’s degree from the Naval War College and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Warfighting.